• Enlarging upon phase 2 the text proposes ”a set of recommendations which allow for the effective planning of our intervention in Venezuela.” Such recommendations would entail:

    Creating a precarious climate which may combine civil unrest with the carefully measured use of armed violence
    using, with the focus on a strategy of ‘siege and suffocate,’ the National Assembly,Venezuala’s parliament, as a way of stifling the government’s ability to govern ; and to hold events and demonstrations, arrest governors, deny credit and repeal insisting, on the domestic political front, upon the interim government and on measures to be taken after the fall of the regime including the formation of an emergency cabinet where the business sector, church hierarchy, unions, NGOs and univerisities are included.

    To arrive at this final phase it is proposed that a short term action plan be vigourously pursued (6 months, with the close of phase 2 towards July-August of 2016) and to apply pressure to smother and paralyse the government, preventing Chavist forces from reforming/regrouping. maintaining the offensive campaign on the propaganda front, creating a climate of distrust, inciting fear and bringing about an ‘ungovernable’ situation. exploiting, in particular, issues such as the shortage of water, food and electricity.”setting the mould” by suggesting that Venezuela is entering a stage of humanitarian crisis as a result of the shortage in food, water and medicine. It is necessary to continue to manipulate the situation to give the message that Venezuela is ”close to collapse/imploding” asking the international community to intervene with humanitarian aid in order to maintain peace and save lives. insisting on the application of the Democratic Charter as agreed with Luis Almagro Lemes (the general secretary of the OAS) and the ex presidents (headed by ex secretary of the OAS, César Gaviria Trujillo). Here, coordination between organisations of the Intelligence Community (IC) and other agencies such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), private communications corporations such as the SIP and various private media agencies (TV, Press, Social media, radio ‘circuits’) is important.

    The efforts we have been making so far as linking Maduro’s government to corruption and money laundering must be continued. As far as this is concerned media campaigns must be devised, with witnesses – who are helping to enforce the decree of the 9th of March, 2015 – protected

    In another area, we must be alive to the reality of the military dimension, even if the campaign we are driving to gain followers and deter opposition to our aims in institutions has been successful to date. For this reason, it is vital to continue with the job of weakening Venezuala’s leadership and destroying its ability to govern.
    As regards the use the government will make of the so-called militias and armed groups a similar reading is necessary. The presence of these fanatical fighters in those towns given priority in the plan is becoming an obstacle for the mobilisation of allied forces and opposition groups on the streets; and an encumbrance to the effective control of strategic military installations. Hence, the request for the neutralisation of these militia in this decisive phase.

    The military training and preparations in recent months with the Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B) in the Palmerola base in Comayagua, Honduras and the Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) allow for the positioning of ‘rapid response’ contingents along a geostrategic arc dotted with ‘control and monitoring’ military bases in the Caribbean islands of Aruba (Reina Beatriz) and Curazao (Hato Rey), Arauca, Larandia, Tres Esquinas, Puerto Leguízamo, Florencia and Leticia in Colombia : constituting as a whole a Forward Operating Base (FOB with range over the central region of Venezuela where political-military might is concentrated). (PL)